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COMMENTS
REMEDIES ON DEFAULT UNDER THE PROPOSED
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AS COMPARED
TO REMEDIES UNDER CONDITIONAL SALES
Since the official draft of the Uniform Commercial Code was com-
pleted and published in 1952, there has been considerable discussion
and criticism of the various Articles in the Code. The first state to
adopt it has been Pennsylvania; it became effective there in July, 1954.
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Texas, and
New York have been considering its adoption.'
Because of the increased interest in the Code, and the fact that
many of the proposed changes would present an entirely new law for
attorneys to consider, this comment will analyze one of the provisions
of the Code that will be of considerable importance to the practitioner.
Article 9, Section Five, pertaining to defaults on secured transactions
will be taken section by section to determine what changes in existing
conditional sales law they will make if adopted.
However, before delving into this subject, it might be well to first
consider some of the broad principles and basic ideas underlying
Article 9, in which these Sections are contained.
Article 9 proposes to integrate, under a single system of legal prop-
ositions and a single system of terminology, the entire range of tran-
sactions in which money debts are secured by personal property. The
Code recognizes the essential uniformity of credit transactions. The
various devices in present use, such as the conditional sale contract,
chattel mortgage, trust receipt, bailment-lease, and pledge, are all
different in form, but have essentially the same broad purpose, to
secure a money debt. The authors of the Code felt that there was no
logic in having transactions, basically similar in substance, although
different in form, result in different legal conclusions. Under Article
9 all differences in form and technical distinctions are immaterial.
However, this is not to say that there are no distinctions; only those
that had no basis in reason or substance are to be done away with.
The Code still recognizes that there are valid differences between
types of collateral and persons involved in security transactions, and
has provided for them. Security transactions are differentiated with
reference to the status of the person whose property secures the debt,
that is, whether consumer or seller of goods, and with reference to the
kind of property put up as collateral. The type of property used as
collateral is further subdivided into consumer goods ;2 farm products ;3
'Uniform Commercial Code, Supplement No. 1. (1955).
2Article 9, Section 9-109(1), Uniform Commercial Code.
3 Supra, note 2, Section 9-109 (4).
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or property used in business, which is subclassified, depending on
whether held for use in business (equipment) 4 or for sale (inven-
tory), 5 or represents the proceeds of the sale of inventory.6
Because it is felt that security transactions are fundamentally the
same, and that there should be the same requirements and consequences
between immediate parties and third parties regardless of the form of
the transaction, does not mean that old documents are to be disre-
garded and discarded. The old forms may still be used, but the sub-
stance of the transaction would be the controlling factor.7 Thus, the
old form of conditional sales contract will not disappear, primarily
because of the inertia inherent in the discarding of the old, familiar
forms, but the transaction will have applied to it the rules of Article 9,
rather than the present rules of law governing conditional sales.
Another policy behind Article 9 is aptly stated by one of the mem-
bers of the committee engaged in the writing of the Article.8
".. . the policy .. . is to encourage the maximum realization
on the collateral by the secured party in the interest of both
himself and the debtor." p.35 3
Before proceeding into the law of default under the Code, it should
be noted that all Sections cited or quoted are from the 1952 Official
Draft of Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code, as
amended in 1954 and published in Supplement No. 1 to the 1952
Official Draft. All Comments to the Sections cited or quoted are
from the 1952 Draft, unless stated to be from the 1954 Supplement.
SECTIoN 9-501
Section 9-501 is entitled as an index of rights on default. The
interesting thing to take note of is that the remedies are cumulative.
Subsection (1) states,
"When a debtor is in default under the security agreement
a secured party may reduce his claim to judgment. If the col-
lateral is accounts, general intangibles,9 chattel paper,10 contract
4 Supra, note 2, Section 9-109(3).
5 Supra, note 2, Section 9-109(5).
6 Supra, note 2, Section 9-106, 9-105(1) (c).
7 BIRNBAUM, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security, 1952
Wis. L. R.v. 348 (1952) ; GILMoRE, The Secured Transaction Article of the
Commnercial Code, 16 LAW & CONT. PROD. 27 (1951).8 Account means a right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper. §9-106.
9 General intangibles is defined as intangibles which are or evidence rights in
personalty and which are neither accounts or contract rights, nor chattel paper,
documents or instruments. §9-106.
10 Chattel paper is defined as a writing which evidences either a security interest
in or a lease of specific consumer goods or specific equipment. When a trans-
action is evidenced both by chattel paper and by an instrument or series of
instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper.
§9-105(1) (b).
1956]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
rights," or instruments,"12 he may in addition proceed under
either Section 9-504 (pertaining to secured party's right to dis-
pose of collateral after default) or Section 9-502 (rights of
assignee when assignor defaults) or both. If the collateral is
documents, he may in addition proceed under Section 9-504
either as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby.
If the collateral is goods, he may in addition do one or more of
the following (except that he cannot accept the collateral in
discharge of the obligation under Section 9-505 and also recover
a deficiency under Section 9-504): (italics added)
(a) foreclose the security interest by any available judicial
procedure;
(b) take possession of the collateral under Section 9-503;
(c) prepare or process the collateral for disposition as pro-
vided in Section 9-504;
(d) sell and recover a deficiency as provided in Section
9-504;
(e) accept the collateral in discharge of the obligation as pro-
vided in Section 9-505.
Apparently, then, under the Code the problem of election of reme-
dies is not as acute as under existing law.1 3 The secured party, pre-
sumably, could not recover more than once, as this would be contrary
to the inherent nature of justice, and would hardly seem to be within
either the spirit or the letter of any law that was sincerely and con-
scientiously devised. However, the secured party is not under the con-
stant threat of tying his hands by proceeding in one manner, dis-
covering it will be unsuccessful, and then learning that he has elected
one path to recovery and is barred from others, without, at the time
he made the "election", realizing he was making one, or that he was
barring himself from other means of recovery.
In those states which have not adopted the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act it has been held, in the absence of statute, that the seller's
remedies of retaking the property and bringing an action for the
purchase price are inconsistent. Thus, the pursuit of one remedy is
a bar to the other. 14 A secured party in such a state would have his
11 Contract right means any right to payment under a contract not yet earned by
performance and not evidenced by any instrument or chattel paper. §9-106.
12 An instrument is defined as a negotiable instrument (defined in §3-104) or a
security (defined in §8-102) or any other writing which evidences a right to
the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of
a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any
necessary indorsement or assignment. §9-105(1) (g).
13 To constitute an election of remedies, the remedies available to the seller must
be inconsistent and proceed upon irreconcilable claims of right. To determine
whether coexistent remedies are inconsistent, the relation of the parties with
reference to the right sought to be enforced as asserted by the pleadings should
be considered, and if the allegations of fact necessary to support one remedy
are substantially inconsistent with those necessary to support the other, then
the adoption of one remedy waives the other. 47 AM. JUR., Sales §896.
14 "It is an election between inconsistent substantive legal relations, that is, be-
tween a contract and no contract." Washington Cooperative Chick Association
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position considerably improved by the adoption of the Code when a
judgment he has obtained proves to be uncollectible, 5 or he, for one
reason or another decides not to prosecute the action to final judgment.
However, there are a number of states that have held that the two
remedies are not inconsistent, aid it might be added that the trend of
recent decisions is toward this view.1 6 Also, the position of the Con-
ditional Sales Act is that the remedies are not inconsistent, until the
entire purchase price has been recovered.1 7 Hence, in these states the
adoption of the Code would not result in a change of the law in rela-
tion to actions for the purchase price and repossession, either before
bringing the action, or subsequent thereto.
The next problem to consider is what is the effect of an attachment
of the goods, or a levy upon them, by the seller-creditor. The Uniform
Conditional Sales Act' provides that the seller loses his right to retake
possession of the goods when he attaches them or levies on them.
Those states that have not adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
arrive at the same result.19
There is nothing in Section 9-501 which directly covers this ques-
tion. However, the reasoning of the courts presently is that the at-
tachment or levy is an act evincing a passage of title to the buyer, and
thus the seller may no longer repossess.20 As stated in the Code and
in the Comments by the reporter,
"Every provision with regard to rights, obligations and reme-
dies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party
or in the debtor." '"2
v. Jacobs, 42 Wash.2d 460, 256 P.2d 294 (1953) ; 47 Am. Jus., Sales, §§896 and
945; Generally, the reason given to support the rule is that repossession is an
assertion of title in the seller, and an action for the price is treating the sale
as absolute and vesting title in the buyer.
15 It would appear from the words, in addition, following the specification of the
right to reduce the claim to judgment in §9-501 that the seller does not make
an election until he has satisfied the judgment.
16 47 AM. Jus., supra, note 13; 113 A.L.R. 653.
17Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Section 24; Wis. STATs. (1953) §122.24; "It
is clearly the contemplation of the Conditional Sales Law that the conditional
vendor may bring an action for the recovery of the purchase price and later
retake possession . . ." Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Nein, 64 S.D. 235, 266 N.W.
156 (1936).
Is Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Section 24.
19 In states holding that a bringing of a suit for the price is an election, it would
obviously follow that an attachment or levy would have the same result. See
note 13. The reason for the rule generally given is that one cannot levy or
attach his own property, thus, taking such steps operates as a waiver of seller's
reservation of title and acknowledges title in the buyer. "It is held, even injurisdictions adhering to the rule that an action for the purchase prices does
not waive a right of repossession, that an attachment or levy of execution upon
the property as that of the vendee is such an election to treat title as having
passed as will prevent the subsequent reclamation of the property." 47 Am.
JuR., Sales, §945; 3 WILLISTON, SALES, §571 (1948).20S'upra, notes 13 and 18.
21 U.C.C. §9-202.
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The parties are free to contract as they desire in regard to who shall
have title, and the form of the agreement will not control. 22 The Code
does not try to define whether the secured party is the legal owner, or
whether the transaction gives a security interest.23 Thus, as title is not
a determining factor in the remedies available, and the purpose of the
Code is to do away with technical distinctions, 24 it would appear that
attachment or levy would not constitute an election, as the seller and
buyer have prior to this determined who has title to the goods and the
attachment or levy would not change this.
The Conditional Sales Act further provides that the seller waives
his right of retaking after he has claimed a lien upon the goods. 25
There is a conflict as to whether the mere filing of a claim for a lien,
either without attempting to enforce it, or attempting to enforce it
unsuccessfully, or attempting to enforce it and either having the suit
dismissed or withdrawn is an election. 26 Some courts hold that it is an
election and bar the seller from his other remedies. 27 Other courts
hold that there is no election until there is a foreclosure of the lien
and judgment is recovered.28
The same split of authority exists in the states that have not
adopted the Uniform Act. According to one line of authorities, the
mere attempt to enforce a lien is a waiver, while others hold that only
attempting to enforce is not sufficient to constitute a waiver. 29
Again the Code contains no specific mention of the problem, but as
title is not the basis on which the remedies lie,30 and the purpose is to
protect both creditor and debtor,3' it would appear that at least the
mere filing of a lien would not bar the secured party from retaking
possession, and it is probable that his other remedies would be barred
only after the foreclosure of the lien.32
At present some jurisdictions hold that there is an election of
remedies when the conditional seller, either before or after default,
22 Supra, note 20, §9-101, Comment.
23 Supra, note 20, §9-202, Comment.
24 Supra, note 20, §9-501, Comment 1.
25 Supra, note 17.
2G Viking Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Thwaits, 215 Wis. 225, 235 N.W. 398 (1934).
27 Ibid; In Re Elkins, 38 F.Supp. 250 (1941).
28 Bolinger v. National Cash Register Co., 52 Ohio App. 217, 3 N.E.2d 640 (1936).
2947 AM. JUR., Sales, §947; 45 A.L.R. 186; The states that hold that the attempt
is a waiver, do so on the theory that this is inconsistent with title being in the
seller.
30 Supra, notes 20, 21, 22.
31 Supra, note 23.
32 As title is not a factor in the Code, and as far as the location of title is con-
cerned, the parties are free to contract as they desire, if the agreement was such
as placed full title in the seller, he probably could not attach, levy on, or file
a lien against the goods as there is no title in the buyer for these to act on.
However, as the parties are free to use old forms, and the conditional sale
form will in all probability continue in use, the buyer will still have beneficial
title, on which a lien, attachment, or levy could act on. See U.C.C., §9-101,
Comment and §9-202.
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transfers purchase-money notes to a third party, even if only as a
security. These courts find that such a transaction indicates an inten-
tion to hold the buyer personally bound as a debtor owing the purchase
price, and to treat the contract as an absolute sale."
Under the Commercial Code this would appear to be an immaterial
event. As the parties are free to determine the location of title,34 and
will do so either expressly or by implication, the transfer of notes has
no significance. Whether or not the seller lost his remedies would
depend on whether he was using the notes as security on a loan that
he made, or whether he was selling his full interest (whatever that
might be according to the contract) to another.
It has also been held that if the seller takes a new note for the
amount of the price remaining unpaid, he has acted so as to vest
title in the buyer, unless it contains an express reservation of title.
There is a dissent from this view, however, by a minority of the
courts.3 5 Interpretation of such a transaction under the Code would
probably be that the seller was merely extending the time of payment.3 6
Because of the emphasis on title, it has been almost universally held
that the taking of a chattel mortgage on the same property covered by
a conditional sale contract is a waiver of the reserved title under the
contract. From this viewpoint there is a necessary inconsistency and
it is inherently impossible for the two security devices to stand to-
gether.37 By removing the question of title, as the Code does, and
looking to the substance of the transaction, it would appear that under
the Code there would be no election. This would be interpreted as the
taking of additional security for the purchase price.38
Thus, it would seem that many of the problems now facing the
conditional seller when his buyer defaults would be eliminated by the
removal of the concept of title as the basis on which the remedies lie,
and recognizing the real basis of the remedies, as is stated in the Com-
ment to Section 9-501,
"The rights of the secured party in the collateral after the
debtor's default are of the essence of a security transaction."
Subsection (3) of Section 9-501 provides that the rights enu-
merated in the previous subsections are not all of those available to
the seller; hence, the buyer and the seller may work out any arrange-
33 47 AM. JuR., Sales, §971; 55 A.L.R. 1161.
34 Supra, notes 20, 21, 22, and 31.
3547 Am. Jua., Sales, §972; 55 A.L.R. 1160.
36 This would probably be the interpretation in view of the fact that the policy of
the Code is to give the seller more leeway without prejudicing the buyer, and
the fact that this is the majority view at present.
37 47 AM. JUR., Sales, §974; 95 A.L.R. 333.
38 The present law is that the mere taking of additional security, unless a chattel
mortgage covering the same goods conditionally sold, is not a waiver of the
reserved title. 47 AM. Ju., Sales, §973.
1956]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ment agreeable to them, with the proviso that the rights and duties
specified in Section 9-501 may only be waived or varied as provided
in the other Sections of the Secured Transactions Part.39
Subsection (4) permits a secured party to proceed either under the
law relating to foreclosure of real estate mortgages, or under the law
as provided in Section 9-501, if the security agreement covers both real
and personal property. As conditional sales contracts do not often
cover anything other than personal property, it is sufficient to state for
the purpose of this comment, that this provides a simplified and faster
remedy where the collateral is both real and personal property.40
SECTION 9-502
This Section does not come within the scope of this comment as
it concerns the rights of an assignee of accounts, chattel paper, con-
tract rights, or instruments held as collateral when the assignor de-
faults on the obligation secured by these items. The Section contem-
plates defaults in accounts receivable financing, the use of paper as
security for loans, and transactions of a similar nature. The sale of
goods with title reserved in the seller is not within its scope, although
the assignee of a conditional sale contract when the conditional seller
assigns it to secure a loan he makes, and then he defaults, would be
covered. It does not include the assignee of the conditional sale con-
tract who takes the contract not as collateral for a loan to the seller, but
who buys the contract and steps into the shoes of the seller. The
assignee's rights are then the same as those of the seller when the
buyer defaults.
4 1
SEcTION 9-503
In this provision42 the rights of the secured party to take possession
after default are detailed.
The first sentence provides the right to take possession of the col-
lateral, unless the parties have otherwise agreed.4 3
39 Throughout the other parts of the Code the policy is to allow matters which
come up between immediate parties to be varied by agreement, but because of
the possibility of a creditor taking advantage of a necessitous debtor, §9-501
adopts a fairly strict attitude on agreements which tend to cut down the rights
of the debtor after default, or which frees the creditor of duties. §9-501, Com-
ment 4; infra, notes 43, 64, and 80.
40 U.C.C. §9-501, Comment 5.
41 U.C.C. §3-201 (Article 3, Commercial Paper).
42 (1) Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace. If the
security agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor to
assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place
reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may
render the equipment unuseable and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's
premises under Section 9-504.
(2) If a secured party elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by
writ of replevin or otherwise.
43 This is one instance where the rights of the seller may be varied by agreement
of the parties.
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Under existing law in those states not having the Conditional Sales
Act is it uniformly held that the vendor has the right to retake the
property on default of the conditional buyer. This is the rule even
though not expressly provided for in the contract, as it is implied by
the form of the contract.
44
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act has a very similar provision 5
giving the conditional seller the right to retake possession.
However, under existing law there are particular circumstances
which affect the right to repossess. If the seller is a foreign corpora-
tion which has not complied with the statutory provisions prescribing
the terms upon which it may do business, it may find that it is unable
to repossess the property.4
6
Another circumstance which may affect the right of the seller to
retake possession is that the sale was to a municipal corporation. Under
certain conditions there would be no right to repossession.
4 7
A third situation affecting the right to repossession is where the
sale is to a buyer who intends to use the property in an illegal man-
ner.
48
44 47 Am. Ju., Sales, §942; 174 A.L.R. 1363.
45 U.C.S.A. §16; Wis. STATS. (1953) §122.16.
46 Some statutes expressly void the contracts as to the foreign corporation, such
as Wis. STATS. (1949) §226.02, which was repealed in 1951. Other states have
construed their statutes to have such effect, while still others operate only on
the remedy, denying a foreign corporation a right to sue on a contract made
at the time at which it had not complied with the necessary conditions. Where
the contracts are declared unenforceable, the corporation cannot sue on the
contract to recover the purchase price. However, the general rule, in the
absence of statutory provision to the contrary, is that the foreign corporation
may still maintain an action for conversion of the property conditionally sold,
or an action to recover possession when it is entitled to possession. A few
states have denied all right to recovery when there has been non-compliance
with the requirements for doing business. Others have held, as Wisconsin did
prior to the repeal of §226.02, that if there has been anything paid in under the
contract, that must be tendered back before the action will lie. Generally the
reason given for allowing these suits is that the failure to follow the statutory
requirements does not place the corporation outside the protection of the law
so that they may be deprived of their property by persons having no legal
right to it. 47 Am. JuR., Sales, §856; 130 A.L.R. 999; Duluth Music Co. v.
Clancy, 139 Wis. 189, 120 N.W. 854 (1909); Wolf Co. v. Kutch, 147 Wis. 209,
132 N.W. 981 (1911).
47 When the sale was not in conformity with statutory requirements for a muni-
cipal contract, the seller cannot retake possession. It might also be unenforce-
able because the municipality, at the time of making the contract, was in debt
in excess of the amount permitted by the state Constitution. In spite of this,
however, some courts, on principles of equity and justice, have permitted the
vendor to recovery the property, even though it is machinery in use, and of
great importance, in the operation of a municipal utility. 47 Amf. Jun., Sales,
§857; 76 A.L.R. 695.
48 A conditional vendor may be unable to enforce his right to repossession because
of knowledge at the time of the sale, or subsequent thereto, that the buyer in-
tended to use the property in an illegal manner. Generally, if the seller knew
of the intended use at the time of the sale, he is not allowed to recover pos-
session on the ground that his retention of title made him a participant in the
illegal use. If he later learns of the illegal use, but does not immediately at-
tempt to recover, he is barred from a later recovery on the ground that his
failure to retake possession immediately made him a participant with the buyer
1956]
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These matters are outside of the scope of the Code, as they pertain
to areas of law other than sales or secured transactions, although
related thereto. Hence, the Code would make no change in them, and
although the right to repossession is stated in the absolute in the Code,
it would be qualified by the rules of law in these related fields.
Under existing law, both under the Conditional Sales Act and
otherwise, the vendor may retake possession of the property even
though the vendee has transferred his interest, and generally he may
recover from purchasers from, or creditors of the conditional buyer,
unless the contract permits a resale or a statute requires the contract
to be recorded and the seller fails to do so. The seller may also re-
claim the property despite the bankruptcy or corporate reorganiza-
tion of the buyer, or despite the conversion of the property into more
valuable goods through the expenditure of money and labor on them.49
Again, some of these matters are not within the scope of the Code;
hence, such matters as the right to reclaim the property from the
trustee in bankruptcy or after a corporate reorganization will be
governed by existing law. 50
The second sentence of Section 9-50351 appears to merely reenact
the provision in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, 52 with the change
in order of words being of seemingly no importance.53
As the case law in those states without the Conditional Sales Act
is generally the same,5 4 the enactment of the Code would make no in-
novation in the right of the conditional vendor, upon default of the
vendee, to repossess himself of the goods peacably, without resorting
to legal process.55
in the illegal use. 47 AM. JUR., Sales, §847; Standard Furniture Co. v. Van
Alstine, 22 Wash. 670, 62 Pac. 145 (1900) ; Lewer v. Cornelius, 72 Wash. 104,
129 Pac. 911 (1913); 166 A.L.R. 1380.
4947 AM. JuP., Sales, §§943, 927, 850, 905; 6 Am. JuR., Bankruptcy, §§227, 229, 566.50 As regards the rights of creditors and purchasers, either before or after the
perfection of the security interest, Section 9-301 to 9-318 applies. This com-
ment will not delve into this complex field, which is not with the range of the
present discussion. For an excellent brief discussion of these Sections see
BIRNBAUM, supra, note 7, pp. 367-374.51 Supra, note 42.
52 U.C.S.A. §16; WIS. STATS. (1953) §122.16.
53 The Comment to §9-503 states, "This article follows the provisions of the
earlier uniform legislation in allowing the secured party in most cases to take
possession without issuance of judicial process." §122.16 provides that repos-
session may be had without legal process, except in the case of household
furniture. If the legislature desired to carry over this policy into the Code
they would have to amend the Code Section in the same manner.
5447 AM. Jue., Sales, §951; 146 A.L.R. 1331; 3 WILLISTON, SALES 226, §579(a)(1948) ; LaPorte Motor Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 397, 245 N.W. 105
(1932).
55 Thus, all the restrictions and qualifications on the right to repossess without
judicial process, that is the restrictions and qualifications in regard to right to
enter the buyer's premises, use of force or deception, requisite of demand, and
acceptance of delayed payments, would appear to apply nothwithstanding the
Code as they are matters outside the scope of the Code.
[Vol. 39
COMMENTS
The sentence permitting the secured party to place in the security
agreement a provision requiring the defaulter to assemble the colla-
teral and make it available to the secured party at a place reasonably
convenient to both parties is a provision not in the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act, nor in any of the statutes covering conditional sales.
Actually, it does not provide anything new to the law. Parties may
contract as they wish, providing that the contract is not illegal or
for an illegal purpose, or the provisions do not come within some other
restriction, such as that against penalties. The Code merely states
this right expressly rather than leaving it to the drafting of the con-
tract.
The last sentence of subdivision (1)56 is something new to the law
of conditional sales.57 It has been placed in the Code in order to aid,
primarily, the party taking heavy equipment as collateral, and rec-
ognizes that the physical removal from the defaulter's plant and the
storage of it until a resale could be both exceedingly expensive and
impractical.58 This provision is obviously of great assistance to the
secured party when the collateral is heavy equipment. However, as
the provision is new, and is not elaborated on in the Code or the
Comments thereto, there will be many problems arising under it. An
enumeration of a few that might come into existence are: (1) What
if the conditional buyer resells to a third party? Probably the per-
fection of the security interest under Part 3 to Article 9 would protect
the secured party. Also, the fact that the equipment has been made
unuseable might be sufficient to give notice to the third party buyer.
(2) What may the buyer do if he does not desire to have the property
remain on his premises? May he remove it and store it at his own
expense without committing a trespass, or possibly a conversion? The
Comment to the Section seems to indicate that he may be able to have
the property removed and stored at his own expense without liability
on his part. (3) May he require the seller to remove it after a reason-
able time has passed and no sale has been made? There is no indi-
cation as to what the answer to this may be. (4) If the debtor desires
removal after a reasonable time, but the seller refuses and is upheld in
his refusal by a court, is this depriving the defaulter of his property
(the area covered by the equipment) without compensation and for a
private purpose? (5) What comes within the term "equipment?"
Would something requiring little expense to remove fall within its
definition? (6) What safeguards are there to prevent the seller from
using this device to harass and oppress the defaulter? While the pro-
56 Supra, note 42.
57Article 9, Secured Transactions, Sales of Accounts, Contract Rights, and
Chattel Papers, Comment, 17 ALBANY LAw RxvEw 145 at 175, (1953).5s Comment to §9-503.
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vision, if adequately policed and intelligently used by the parties and
the courts, could aid both parties, it could also become a method by
which the seller could prevail over the buyer's legitimate desires to a
great extent.
Subsection (2) 59 is optional. It was added because it was doubtful
whether in some states a secured party had the right to proceed by
replevin in the absence of a special or general property interest in the
goods in the absence of a statute conferring such authority. It may be
omitted in states where it is unnecessary.10
SECTION 9-50461
As a first matter, it might be well to comment on those points which
are the same or similar to present law, and then take the changes.
5 9 Supra, note 42.
60 Comment to §9-503 in 1955 Supplement.
61 (1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or
all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially rea-
sonable preparation or processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the Article
on Sales. (Article 2) The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order
following to
(a) the reasonable expense of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, selling
and the like to the extent the recovery thereof is not prohibited by law or
agreement;
(b) the satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by the security interest under
which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security in-
terest in the collateral if written notification of demand therefor is re-
ceived before distribution of the proceeds is completed.
If the security agreement secures an indebtedness, the secured party must ac-
count to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor
is liable for any deficiency....
(2) Disposition of the collateral may be by public sale or private proceedings
and may be made by one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be
as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms
must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized
market the secured party must give to the debtor, and to any other secured
party who has a security interest in the collateral to be disposed of and who
has filed a financing statement in this state or is known to be such by the
secured party making the disposition, reasonable notification of the time and
place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any
private sale or other intended disposition is to be made. Notification may be
sent to addresses given in a financing statement if the secured party has no
knowledge of different addresses. The secured party may buy at any public
sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market
or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quo-
tations he may buy at private sale.
(3) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the dis-
position transfers to a purchaser for value all rights of the debtor, discharges
the security interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien
subordinate thereto, and the purchaser takes free of all such rights and in-
terests even though the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of
this Part or of any judicial proceedings.
(a) in the case of a judicial sale if the purchaser has no knowledge of any
defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured
party or other bidder; or
(b) in any other case if the purchaser acts in good faith.
(4) The transfer of collateral by a secured party to a person who is liable to
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In the Comment to the Section it is stated,
"Subsection (1) in general follows prior law in its provisions
for the application of proceeds . . ."
Section 21 of the Conditional Sales Act62 has the same provision in
somewhat different language, which, however, does not appear to be
substantially in variance with the Code, except that there is no require-
ment in the Conditional Sales Act to apply the proceeds to junior lien
claimants. The proceeds must be so applied under the Code, if the
junior lien claimants make written demand, because of subsection
(3) which discharges the junior interest by the disposition of the
goods.
In those states which do not have the Uniform Act, and which do
not have a statute covering the disposition of the proceeds, there is a
conflict as to the way in which the proceeds are to be handled if there
is no provision in the contract itself. Where it is held that on repos-
session of the goods the seller becomes the owner of the property free
from any equity of the buyer, the seller is under no duty to account
to the buyer as to the disposition of the proceeds. But another line of
authority holds that the defaulting buyer may call for an account, and
may recover the surplus over the amount necessary to liquidate the
balance due and pay the expenses of resale. This result is reached on
the ground that the retaking does not extinguish the rights of the
parties, and the seller must deal with the property as security, recog-
nizing the equitable rights of the defaulting buyer. 63
The Code would reconcile this confusion and provide a standard
application of proceeds, and recognizing the fact that primarily this
is a security transaction, would protect both parties by requiring any
surplus to be paid to the debtor, and making the debtor liable for any
deficiency 4
One of the changes of significance is the emphasis on private rather
than public sale, where the emphasis is in the Condtional Sales Act.0 5
The reason for this change is aptly stated in the Comment to Section
9-504.
"Although public sale is recognized, it is hoped that private
sale will be encouraged where, as is frequently the case, private
sale through commercial channels will result in higher realiza-
tion on collateral for the benefit of all parties."
him under a guaranty, endorsement, repurchase agreement or the like is not a
sale or disposition of collateral under this Article, and the transferee there-
after has the rights and duties of the secured party with regard to the col-
lateral.
62 WIs. STATS. (1953) §122.21.
63 47 Am. JUR., Sales, §956, 966, 969; 99 A.L.R. 1288 at 1294.6 4 Sutpra, note 6, subsection (1). Note that in regard to liability for a deficiency
the parties may vary the provision by their own agreement.6SU.C.S.A. §19; Wis. SATs. (1953) §122.19.
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Along with the requirement of public sale, the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act has elaborate requirements for giving notice of the
sale.66 The Code provides only that reasonable notification of dis-
position be given to the debtor and to other secured parties who have
filed or are known to him. "Reasonable notification" is not defined in
the Code, however, in the Comment to Section 9-504 it is stated,
"... at a minimum it must be sent in such time that persons
entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to take appropriate
steps to protect their interest by taking part in the sale or other
disposition if they so desire."
While this may seem on the surface to give to the repossessing seller
a considerable advantage, it is submitted that actually it will be of
aid to the defaulting buyer in many situations. While granting that
"reasonable" is a nebulous and vague term, it is used in many fields
of law and has not caused any chaos or considerable disorder. Under
Section 19 of the Conditional Sales Act the seller was required to
give the buyer ten days' notice. While this may have been sufficient
time in many instances, there certainly were others where ten days
was too short a time for the buyer to take any effective action to pro-
tect himself. More than ten days would be required under the Code
in such situations.
Where there are no statutes governing the matter, the rights of
the parties in the matter of resale is dependent on the provisions of
the contract and the view of the jurisdiction as to the effect of repos-
session. Where it is held that on repossession the seller becomes the
owner free from any equity of the defaulting buyer, obviously, he
may resell or not as he wishes, and in the manner he desires. However,
where he is required to protect the equities of the buyer, the buyer may
force a sale by demanding one.67 In the demand for resale, or a
court order requiring one, the type of sale, public or private, could be
stipulated.
Thus, the Code would make a great change in some states, and not
much of an alteration of the law in others. However, it would provide
the defaulting buyer with greater protection, as the Code makes
definite what must be done, and a waiver of its provisions may be had
only in the specified instances.6
Another change is that the disposition of the collateral is not
restricted to a sale. It may also be leased. While the parties could
always have made such a provision in the contract, none of the laws
governing the subject provided for any disposition other than a sale.
The addition of this is an aid where, for some reason, the provision is
66 Ibid.
6747 AM. JUR., Sales, §966; 99 A.L.R. 1288.
68 Supra, note 61, subsection (2) ; Supra, note 39.
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left out of the contract, but both parties would be better protected by
some other disposition than a sale.
The third change of significance is the lack of any set period within
which the repossessed property must be disposed of, except in the
case of consumer goods falling within the provisions of Section 9-505
(1). The idea of not requiring any time in which the repossessing
seller has to make a sale was adopted from the Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act.8
9
The Conditional Sales Act required that a sale had to be made not
less than ten days nor more than thirty days after the retaking of
possession.70 The obvious fault with this provision is that it has no
relation to practical selling in order to obtain the maximum price. The
Code would allow a delay in selling if there was no reasonable market
for the goods at the time, or the secured party could sell almost im-
mediately if he could get his best price then. It also provides for
sales in units, which would be particularly advantageous in the cases
where no one party would desire to buy the entire collateral, or to
attempt to sell it in one piece would force the price down.
Outside of the Conditional Sales Act and the statutes of some of
the states which provide a time limit within which the repossessing
party has to sell, any provision of this nature has to be contained in
the contract, and a buyer is not often in a position where he can get
the terms most advantageous to himself in such a matter.71
The provision that the secured party may buy at public sale is not
new to the law.72 Because the provision for private sales is a rela-
tively new statutory concept, there is no present interpretation of any
statute on the subject.7 3 What will be construed to be within collateral
of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or of a type which
is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations is difficult
to say. The Comment to the Section gives no indication of what the
intent of the framers was in the construction of this portion. On its
face it would appear that almost all consumer goods customarily sold
under conditional sales contracts would be included. The seller could
take advantage of the buyer by the use of this provision if it is not
carefully policed by both the courts and the defaulting buyer and his
attorney.
Of course, the principle limitation on the repossessing seller is that
the disposition must be commercially reasonable. Some tests as to what
is commercially reasonable are contained in Section 9-507. Because of
69 U.T.R.A. §6 (3) (b) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.36 (2) (b).70Supra, note 65.
7147 Am. JUR., Sales, §967.
72 Siupra, note 65.
7 Even the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, supra, note 69, does not provide for the
entruster purchasing at a private sale.
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their relevancy in a discussion of 9-504 they will be commented on
at this point.
"The fact that a better price could have been obtained by sale
at a different time or in a different method from that selected
by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that
the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner.
If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual
manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the
price current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has
otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commercial prac-
tices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in
a commercially reasonable manner .... The term 'commercially
reasonable' includes, among other things, obtaining approval of
the secured party's plan of disposition in a judicial proceeding
or by a bona fide creditor's committee or representative of
creditors." Section 9-507(1)
The Comment to the Section further elucidates on what the term
includes.
"One recognized method of disposing of repossessed col-
lateral is for the secured party to sell the collateral to or through
a dealer-a method which in the long run may realize better
average returns since the secured party does not usually main-
tain his own facilities for making such sales. . . . However,
none of the specific methods of disposition set forth . . . is to
be regarded as either required or exclusive ..
Probably one of the major criticisms of the secured transactions
part of the Code has been of the term "commercially reasonable." It
has been attacked as being both too liberal in regard to the secured
party, and too restrictive in regard to him.7 4 Although there will be
problems in regard to exactly what comes within the term, it is a
considerable improvement over the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
which strait-jackets the seller, contains requirements almost entirely
unrelated to the practical world of selling, and consequently is of
benefit to neither the buyer or the seller, but only to those who find it
profitable to make a business of buying at forced sales and then
turning around and selling at a large profit to the public. The default-
ing buyer, if the Code was law, would have more assurance of his
debt being satisfied by the resale, and the seller would not often be in
the position of carrying a non-paying debtor for an unreasonable
length of time because of the unprofitable process of repossession and
resale, which the non-paying debtor is well aware of.
This Section also contains another provision which is not within the
scope of this comment, but which will aid in realizing a greater amount
on resale.7 5
4 GILMoRE, supra, note 7.
7 Subsection (3), supra, note 61, provides the protection to be given to the buyer
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This Section presents no striking revisions in existing law. The
point of importance in it is that it applies only to consumer goods. To
the extent that conditional sales are not all of consumer goods there
is a change, as the discussion of the previous Section discloses. A
seller could always accept the goods as a discharge of the obligation,
and in many instances he did discharge the obligation by repossession,
although that was not his intention.77 The Code provides that this is
an alternative to be used when the parties are better off without a
resale and the resulting expenses and legal consequences. 78
A change has been made in regard to when there must be a resale.
Under the Conditional Sales Act the repossessing seller has to resell
if over 50% of the purchase price has been paid at the time of the
retaking.79 Under the Code the amount necessary to have been paid
in order for there to be a compulsory sale has been increased to 60%.80
The time in which the seller has to dispose of the collateral has also
been lengthened-from thirty days to ninety days.8 '
Where less than 60% of the cash price has been paid, the seller
must notify the defaulting buyer in writing if he intends to retain the
collateral in satisfaction of the obligation.82 This provision was not in
the Uniform Act.
In both the Code and the Conditional Sales Act the defaulting
buyer can force a resale by the seller on written demand for a resale.
83
at the resale, which will induce more people to buy at resales of repossessed
goods..
76 (1) In the case of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods if the
debtor has paid 60% of the cash price and has not signed after default a state-
ment renouncing his rights a secured party who has taken possession of col-
lateral must dispose of it under Section 9-504 and if he fails to do so within
ninety days after he takes possession the debtor may at his option recover in
conversion or under Section 9-507(1) on secured party's liability.(2) In any other case a secured party in possession may, after default, propose
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such
proposal shall be given to the debtor and to any other secured party who has a
security interest in the collateral and who has filed a financing statement in
this state or is known to be such by the secured party in possession. If the
debtor or other person entitled to receive notification objects in writing within
thirty days from the receipt of the notification and causes such written objec-
tion to be delivered to the secured party, the secured party must dispose of
the collateral under Section 9-54, but in the absence of receipt of such written
objection within said thirty days the secured party may hold the collateral or
dispose of it free from the requirements of this Article.
77 See previous discussion on election of remedies and footnotes 13 to 38; 47 AM.
Jup., Sales, §960.
78 Comment 1 to Section 9-505.
79 Supra, note 65.
so stpra, note 76(1) ; Also, note that this is an instance where the debtor may
waive his rights, although he may do so only after default.
81 Supra, notes 65 and 76(1).
82 Supra, note 76 (2).
83 Section 9-505(2) ; U.C.S.A. §20; Wis. STATS. (1953) §122.20.
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The resale must be made within thirty days under the Uniform Act,
and within ninety days under the Code.8 4
Whether or not the defaulting buyer has a right to demand a resale
in the states that do not have a statute governing the matter, depends
on the contract and the attitude of the jurisdiction in regard to the
effect of repossession. The contract could, but usually would not, pro-
vide that the debtor may demand a resale under certain conditions.
In the absence of a contract provision, the attitude of the court would
control. If the court is one which has adopted the view that retaking
is a rescission and terminates all rights of the buyer, then the buyer
would have no standing to demand a resale.8 5 Where the court recog-
nizes that the defaulting party has equitable interests in the collateral,
he may, under some circumstances, enforce a resale.8 6
The adoption of the Code would be a great help to the defaulting
buyer in those states which now offer him no right to demand a resale,
when the market is such that not only could the obligation be satisfied,
but there would also be a surplus remaining.
SECTION 9-5068T
The Conditional Sales Act provides a number of ways in which the
defaulting buyer may redeem the collateral after it has been repos-
sessed. If the seller fails to give the notice of intention to retake,8
the buyer has ten days in which to redeem. If the seller serves the
notice of intention to retake, the buyer has no less than twenty days,
nor more than forty days, in which to redeem.8 9
The Code gives the debtor the right of redemption, but places no
specific time on its operation, except as to consumer goods. The seller
does not have to sell within any specific period, and the buyer has no
specific period within which to redeem, except as to consumer goods.90
As the seller may make successive sales of parts of the collateral, the
buyer may reclaim only what has not been sold at the point at which
he desires to redeem. These provisions would appear to work no
84Supra, notes 65 and 76(1).
85 Supra, note 67; 78 C.J.S., Sales, §600.
86 Watkins v. Carter, 267 Ky. 241, 101 S.W.2d 932 (1937), "At least where a sub-
stantial portion of the purchase price has been paid by the buyer prior to de-
fault on his part and the repossession by the seller ... the seller should afford
some measure of protection to the buyer's equity in the property.... We are
of the opinion that the proper measure of protection in such state of case is
obtained by resale of the property .. " In this case one-third of the purchase
price had been paid; 78 C.J.S., Sales, §627(c).
87 At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into
a contract for its disposition under §9-504 or before the obligation has been
discharged under §9-505(2) the debtor may reclaim the collateral by tendering
payment of all sums due under the defaulted agreement as well as the ex-
penses reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and pre-
paring for disposition.
88 U.C.S.A. §17; WIs. STATS. (1953) §122.17.
89 Ibid.
90 Sections 9-504 and 9-505.
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hardships, except possibly as to the buyer being in some doubt as to
how soon he must get his funds together to effect a redemption. As
any resale must be commercially reasonable, and as that includes
approval of the plan of disposition, 91 the seller could not resell so fast
as to prevent a redemption by the debtor.
The provisions regarding what must be tendered in order that the
debto- may reclaim the collateral are similar, but there are some
significant changes. The Code does not contain the provision for the
redemption on the performance, or tendering of performance of any
condition precedent to passage of title that has been broken, but speaks
only of tendering of payment of all "sums" due. Of what importance
this omission is, it is hard to say, although in view of the policy to
protect both parties, it might be construed to allow a redemption when
the reason for default was the breaching of a condition other than
payment, and the default has been cured by performance or tender of
performance.
Another change of importance is in regard to the amount necessary
to be tendered when there has been a default in payment and the con-
tract contains an acceleration clause. The courts have construed the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act as to permit a redemption on the
tender of the amounts due at the time of the retaking, even though
the contract contained an acceleration clause. Thus, the seller cannot
insist on the full purchase price as a condition of redemption. 2 How-
ever, under the Code the secured party may demand the full purchase
price as a condition of redemption, if there is an acceleration clause.
"All sums due under the defaulted agreement" is to be construed as
the entire balance. 93
The remainder of the provisions regarding the inclusion of tle
reasonable expenses incurred in retaking in the amount to be tendered,
is the same in the Code as in the Conditional Sales Act.
The debtor does not have the right under the Code to demand a
written statement as to the sum due and the expenses incurred, as he
has under the Uniform Act.94 The lack of this provision may cause
some trouble where the secured party attempts to defeat the debtor's
right of redemption by keeping him in the dark as to the correct
amount necessary to be paid or tendered. While the debtor might be
able to remedy this in other ways, it is submitted that the addition of
such a provision might possibly save some unnecessary problems.
Where neither the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, nor any other
statute governing redemptions on default has been passed, nor is there
91 Section 9-507(2).
9247 AM. Jup., Sales, §959; 78 C.J.S., Sales §628(a); 99 A.L.R. 1301.
9 Comment to Section 9-506.
94 U.C.S.A. §18; Wis. STATs. (1953) §122.18.
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a provision in the contract, there is a split of authority as to whether
the defaulting party has a right to redeem. Some jurisdictions afford
no right of redemption at all, wl. .as in others he may redeem by
paying the balance due, unless time is made of the essence of the
contract.95
The adoption of the Code in these Lates would make little or great
change, depending on which view they took before the adoption. As
to the problem of acceleration clauses, it has been held under statutes
other than the Uniform Act, and under case law, that the amount
necessary to be tendered is the entire balance; therefore, in this respect,
there would be no revision of the law.9 6
SECTION 9-50797
The principle limitation on the secured party's right to dispose of
the collateral is the requirement that he proceed in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner.9 s The Code recognizes the fact that
the best remedy so far as the defaulting buyer is concerned is one
which he has available prior to an illegal disposition. Therefore, the
Code provides that the buyer, by court order, may restrain the secured
party from proceeding in an unreasonable manner, and such order
may also provide that the seller proceed under specified terms and
conditions, or that the sale be made by a representative of creditors
where solvency proceedings have been instituted. 9
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act has no comparable provision,
nor does it appear that any of the other statutes governing conditional
sales have such remedy either. However, it has been held that injunc-
tive relief will lie in order to enforce statutory rights. 00 Thus, in
those states where there is a statute governing the procedure which
a repossessing seller must follow in the disposition of the collateral,
it would appear that the Code will make no change, except to state
clearly that the remedy is available.
In states that have no statutes in regard to the procedure that must
be followed on a resale, whether or not the adoption of the Code would
9547 Am. JuR., Sales, §958; 78 C.J.S., Sales, §628(a) ; 99 A.L.R. 1288.96 Supra, note 92.
97 (1)If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered or restrained on
appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or
any person entitled to notification has a right to recover from the secured party
any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part. If the
collateral is consumer goods the debtor has a right to recover in any event an
amount not less than the credit service charge or time price differential plus
10% of the cash price or principal amount of the debt.(2)The substance of subsection (2) is quoted in the discussion of Section 9-504.
98 Comment to Section 9-507.
99 Ibid.
100 "An injunction is also held to be an appropriate remedy for a violation of all
statute rights." I JoYcE, INJUNcTIONs, §2(a), p. 8 (1909) ; Livingston v. Van
Ingen, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 507 (1812).
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cause a change would be dependent upon the view of the court towards
the effect of repossession by tI' seller, and the terms of the contract.
Where the rule is that reposse Ibn vests the full ownership of the
collateral in the seller, free of all rights and equities of the defaulting
buyer, obviously there would be a revision. Under this view the de-
faulting buyer would have'no ; anding in any court to force the seller
to do anything in regard to the property.10' However, where the
jurisdiction recognizes the repossession as a means of security, and
holds that the seller must protect the equitable rights of the defaulting
buyer, 0 2 there would be no change, providing the contract contained
provisions covering the resale, as equity has jurisdiction to grant in-
junctions to enforce an equitable interest in chattels, and to restrain
the transfer of such property. 0 3
It is questionable whether this remedy provided by the Code will
be of much value in view of the practical problem of the debtor know-
ing or learning of the contemplated unreasonable sale. The extreme
scarcity of cases on point would appear to indicate that it is not often
that the buyer learns of the illegal resale until after it has been made.
In regard to liability after disposition has been made under Section
9-507, the debtor may recover his damages, and if the collateral was
consumer goods, his damages are not less than the credit charge, carry-
ing charge, or interest, plus ten percent of the cash price or principal
amount of the debt.1' 4 Also, if the secured party has failed to sell
within ninety days after he has retaken possession, in cases where he
must dispose of the property, 10 5 the debtor may recover the amount
above, under Section 9-507, or in conversion under Section 9-505, at
his option.
Under the Uniform Act there are two provisions which provide
remedies for the defaulting party in case the seller fails to follow the
statutory provisions.'0 Where a notice of intention to retake has been
served, and the buyer has made a written demand on the seller for a
statement as to the amount due on the contract, which the seller fails
to furnish in a reasonable time, the buyer may recover ten dollars
plus all damages suffered because of the failure. 0 7 Where the seller
fails to comply with the provisions of the statute in regard to its other
provisions, the buyer may recover his actual damages, but in no event
less than twenty-five percent of the sum of all payments made under
the contract, with interest. 08
101 Supra, note 63.
102 Ibid.
1034 PomERoy's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §1339, p. 937 (1941).
104 Supra, note 97.
105 Section 9-505.
106U.C.S.A. §18 and §25; Wis. STATS. (1953) §122.18 and §122.25.
107 U.C.S.A. §18; Wis. STATS. (1953) §122.18.
108 U.C.S.A. §25; Wis. STATS. (1953) §122.25.
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Whether the change from twenty-five percent of the amount paid to
ten percent of the cash price will help the buyer and make the seller
more careful in following the procedure for resale would depend
entirely on the cash price and the amount paid in. A defaulting buyer
could recover more under the Code, or he might be in a better position
under the Uniform Act, depending on the two mentioned variables.
Where the seller retakes possession, but fails to comply with the
statute, he cannot recover a deficiency judgment.10 9 There is no com-
parable provision in the Code, and from its absence it could be assumed
he could still recover any deficiency. As a practical matter, though,
there would be no sense to this if the deficiency was not greater than
what the buyer could counterclaim for as his damages for failure to
make a commercially reasonable resale.
The provision under Section 9-505 allowing the buyer to sue in
conversion if the seller fails to sell within the stated period is a new
concept, not contained in the Conditional Sales Act. Its effect is to
give the buyer an option to recover between two amounts, thus putting
him in the advantageous position of being able to pick the remedy
which will give him the greatest amount of damages, and consequently,
provide the seller with an effective incentive to abide by the terms of
the Code.
Where there is no statute governing the liabilities of the seller, the
defaulting buyer's remedies depend upon the contract provisions and
the view of the jurisdiction as to the effect of repossession by the
seller. By the great weight of authority, he is not entitled to a return
of the amount paid in up to the time of repossession. 110 In some states,
however, if there is no forfeiture clause, and in some instances even
when there is one, the retaking is construed as a rescission of the
contract, and the seller is liable to account to the buyer for the amount
paid to that point, less damages to the property and reasonable compen-
sation for its use."'
Where the seller retakes the property unlawfully and resells it. he
is liable in conversion. 2
Briefly, it can be stated in conclusion, that the Code is an attempt,
and one that appears to be successful in most instances, to provide
better protection to both parties in a secured transaction, without all
of the highly technical requirements of the present law. It has one
feature that commends it, and that is that it allows the parties more
room to operate in when they are both businessmen, and, recognizing
that the consumer is usually not in the position of strength either at
109 Mack International Truck Corp. v. Thelen Co., 205 Wis. 434, 237 N.W. 75
(1931) ; Carl v. McDonald, 60 Ariz. 170, 133 P.2d 1013 (1934) ; 37 A.L.R. 106.11037 A.L.R. 100; 83 A.L.R. 965; 99 A.L.R. 1292; 78 C.J.S., Sales, §627(a).
III Ibid.
112 Ibid.
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the time of making the contract, or at the time of default, provides
more stringent requirements for the secured party to follow, but not
such as tie him down or make selling on a secured basis impracticable.
DONALD D. ECKHADT
